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I. Introduction 
 
Much of the litigation in higher education during the last year continued to focus on 
employee speech.  Whether speech in the classroom, speech related to college and university 
governance, or research related speech, faculty members saw continuing aggressive challenges to 
what they are allowed to say publicly or email privately.  Many of the cases included in this 
outline follow up on information provided at this conference over the past two years as cases 
make their way through the legal system.  This outline also contains information on new speech 
cases filed and a brief look at how state “open records” laws are being used to target faculty 
members’ communications concerning their scholarship and research.  In addition, this outline 
includes cases and information touching on such issues as affirmative action, employment 
discrimination, intellectual property rights, state collective bargaining laws, and other 
miscellaneous areas of interest for those in higher education. 
 
II. First Amendment and Speech Rights for Faculty and other Academic Professionals 
 
Free speech in U.S. academia has been challenged since the Supreme Court decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.  Faculty members and academic professionals should have the right to 
freely express themselves, both in the classroom and externally, because they play an important 
role in providing necessary criticism, insight, and invention in society.    
 
The AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure outlines 
three fundamental freedoms of faculty: (1) the freedom to research and publish; (2) the freedom 
                                                          
1
This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to this audience that have 
come out over approximately the past twelve months.  It is intended to provide general information, not binding 
legal guidance.  If you have a legal inquiry, you should consult an attorney in your state who can advise you on your 
specific situation. 
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to discuss their subject in the classroom; and (3) the freedom to speak as citizens, members of the 
learned profession, and officers of an educational institution.   
 
The 1940 Statement declares:  
“College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, 
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, 
they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special 
position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and 
educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their 
profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times 
be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the 
opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not 
speaking for the institution.” 
 
The freedom to speak as citizens is also recognized in the AAUP’s Statement on Extramural 
Utterances and the Statement on Professors and Political Activity.  Recent court decisions, 
however, have tended towards stifling academic free speech and in discouraging open discussion 
of matters of public concern.  
 
 
THE CONTROLLING CASE 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a public employee does not receive 
First Amendment protection when speech is made pursuant to his or her official duties.  This 
ruling has drastically changed employer-employee relations in the public service sector, as well 
as the legal landscape related to employee speech rights.  
 
Despite positive language by the Supreme Court majority recognizing that academic 
speech may need to be treated differently, this case has served as a wake-up call for public 
employees and faculty members at public institutions in the wake of lower courts’ interpretations 
of Garcetti.   
Richard Ceballos, a district attorney in California, was demoted and transferred after he 
wrote a memorandum to his supervisors, criticizing certain practices by the sheriff’s department.   
Ceballos subsequently sued his supervisors, arguing that they had retaliated against him for 
writing the memorandum and violated his First Amendment right to free speech.  After a trial 
court dismissed Ceballos’ claim, ruling that his memorandum was not protected speech because 
it was written as part of his employment duties, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision, ruling 
that First Amendment protections did apply.   
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and held that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”  The Court reasoned that public employers must 
have the ability to restrict the speech of their employees in order for public institutions to operate 
efficiently and effectively.  
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 In its decision, the Supreme Court did acknowledge a concern over how this decision 
might pertain to academic speech, noting that “there is some argument that expression related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that 
are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”  The 
majority in Garcetti thereby suggested that its employee-speech analysis may not apply to 
academic settings.  
Unfortunately, many lower courts have ignored the apparent academic carve-out and 
have used Garcetti to limit academic freedom and faculty speech rights in higher education.  The 
misuse of Garcetti in the courts poses a serious risk to academic freedom and may have far 
reaching effects on faculty members and academic professionals who teach. 
A. Speech Related to Scholarship and Promotion 
 
1. Adams v. Trs. Of the Univ. of N. Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)  
 
In this case, Michael Adams, a tenured associate professor in criminology at the 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington, sued the university, claiming viewpoint 
discrimination in violation of his First Amendment rights.  Specifically, Adams claimed that his 
application for promotion to full professor was denied because of his public criticism of the 
university and his politically conservative scholarship.   
 
According to Adams, at the time he started at UNC-Wilmington he was an atheist with 
liberal political beliefs. Over time, Adams had a change of heart and became a self-described 
Christian conservative.  Problems surfaced between Adams and his colleagues when Adams 
criticized his colleagues via email for questioning job candidates about their political views and 
expressing “anti-religious sentiments during the interview process.”  Adams authored various 
publications which criticized other members of the faculty and the administration at the 
university and also began writing a column for a website that showcased his conservative 
religious beliefs.   
In July 2006, Adams formally applied for promotion to full professor.  Adams’ 
department ultimately voted 7-2 against recommending promotion; the chair adopted the vote 
and denied Adams’ application, which ended the process.  In a letter to Adams, the chair said the 
decision was based upon Adams’ thin record of productivity, his undistinguished teaching, and 
his insufficient record of service to the university and the profession. 
 
In his lawsuit filed in federal court, Adams based his free speech claims on his columns, 
publications, and presentations – many of which criticized UNC-Wilmington administrators or 
staff; others addressed controversial issues and incorporated Adams’ conservative views.  Adams 
had either referred to these materials in his promotion packet or explicitly included them in the 
packet.  Citing Garcetti, the district court characterized the inclusion of these materials as an 
“implicit acknowledgement that they were expressions made pursuant to his professional duties – 
that he was acting as a faculty member when he said them,” and, their inclusion thus “marked his 
speech, at least for promotion purposes, as made pursuant to his official duties.”  The court made 
no inquiry as to whether these promotion materials would also constitute the kind of “speech 
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related to scholarship or teaching” that the Garcetti majority indicated might not be governed by 
its “official duties” analysis.   
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit overturned the district court decision and held that Garcetti 
contains a clear reservation of the application of its analysis to academic speech at a public 
university.  The court pointed out that the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of 
whether the “official duties” analysis applies where issues of "scholarship or teaching" are in 
play.  The circuit court reasoned that “[a]pplying Garcetti to the academic work of a public 
university faculty member under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First 
Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during his 
employment.”  Choosing to recognize the particular characteristics of a professor’s appointment, 
the court noted that “Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct employee duty 
than the general concept that professors will engage in writing, public appearances, and service 
within their respective fields.” 
The Fourth Circuit also concluded that “Adams’ speech was clearly that of a citizen 
speaking on a matter of public concern.”  Such speech is explicitly protected by the First 
Amendment, and the court rejected the district court’s reasoning that Adams’ speech should not 
receive First Amendment protection because he included his publications in his promotion 
packet.  The circuit court held that the district court’s decision that protected speech was 
converted into unprotected speech was an error as a matter of law.   
The AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of Professor Adams in this case and is 
pleased with the court’s ruling.  It is unclear whether the university will choose to appeal this 
case to the Supreme Court. 
 
B. Speech Related to University Governance and Administrative Matters 
 
1. Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012) 
 
 In this case, Scott Savage, the head reference librarian at Ohio State University at 
Mansfield, appealed a federal district court ruling, dismissing his claim that his First Amendment 
rights had been violated and that he was constructively discharged because of his speech.  The 
district court decision appeared to take the view that all speech made as a member of a faculty 
governance committee would be unprotected under the “official duties” analysis of Garcetti. 
  
 In 2006, Savage served on a committee choosing a book to assign to all incoming 
freshman. His suggestion, The Marketing of Evil – a book that the Ohio district court found 
contained “a chapter discussing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior that has gained 
general acceptance under the guise of political correctness” – led to considerable controversy 
among campus faculty.  Several gay faculty members filed sexual harassment complaints with 
the university against Savage, and Savage filed his own complaints of harassment against several 
faculty members.  After the university rejected both sides’ charges, Savage resigned and then 
sued, claiming he had been retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment.   
  
 The court held that Savage’s book recommendation was made “pursuant to his official 
duties” in serving on the committee, and therefore was not protected speech under Garcetti.  The 
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court decided that “it [made] no difference that [Savage] was not strictly required to serve on the 
committee.”  Although noting that several other decisions from the same district court had 
recognized Garcetti’s academic freedom reservation, the court held that Savage’s speech did not 
fall within this category: “The recommendation was made pursuant to an assignment to a faculty 
committee… [and], without exceptional circumstances, such activities cannot be classified as 
‘scholarship or teaching.’” 
 
 Savage appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  On January 4, 2012, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, ruling that Savage’s speech was not 
protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a 
member of the committee charged with choosing the book assignment.  The court further stated 
that it believed Savage’s speech was also not protected by the First Amendment because it was 
“only loosely, if at all, related to academic scholarship,” as mentioned in the Supreme Court’s 
Garcetti decision. 
 
2. Capeheart v. Hahs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14363 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2011), sub nom. 
Capeheart v. Terrell, No. 11-1473 (7
th
 Cir. argued Dec. 8, 2011). 
 
Professor Loretta Capeheart has held a position at Northeastern Illinois University 
(NEIU) since September of 2002 and was awarded tenure in April of 2006.  Capeheart teaches 
and researches social inequality and social change issues in the university’s Department of 
Justice Studies, focusing on the incarceration of Latinos.  Capeheart is also the faculty advisor 
for a student organization called the Socialist Club, which has distributed leaflets opposing 
efforts by the military to recruit students at campus job fairs. 
In 2007, Professor Capeheart and two students protested the presence of CIA recruiters at 
the university’s job fair.  The two students were arrested by campus police.  Capeheart advocated 
on behalf of those specific students with several administrators at the university and she sent 
several emails about the arrests to the campus community.  Capeheart also asked the Vice 
President of Student Affairs about the arrests, and at a NEIU Faculty Council for Students 
Affairs meeting she criticized the university’s use of campus police against peaceful student 
protesters.  In addition, Capeheart spoke out at a campus event featuring the Provost and blamed 
excessive administrative spending for budget problems that she claimed led to a low number of 
Latino faculty.  Shortly after these events, members of the Justice Studies Department faculty 
elected Capeheart to be their department chair.  The NEIU Provost, however, disregarded the 
faculty vote and refused to appoint Capeheart to the position.  
Capeheart sued the university, alleging that the Provost retaliated against her for speaking 
up at the faculty council meeting and for advocating on behalf of the arrested students.  Relying 
on Garcetti, the district court ruled that Capeheart’s statements concerning military recruitment 
and the arrest of the students were not protected by the First Amendment. The district court 
stated that “the speech at issue was made pursuant to Capeheart’s professional responsibilities.”  
The district court further refused to recognize an exception to Garcetti for faculty at public 
institutions, saying that “since Garcetti, courts have routinely held that even the speech of faculty 
members of public universities is not protected when made pursuant to their professional duties.”  
The district court concluded, therefore, that “Capeheart’s speech regarding military and CIA 
5
Westcott: Annual Legal Update
Published by The Keep, 2012
  6 
recruiting on campus and the university’s treatment of student protesters is not protected under 
the First Amendment.”  
This case has been appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and the AAUP filed an amicus brief 
in the case.  The AAUP’s amicus brief in support of Capeheart argues that “the district court 
arrived at [its] distressing resolution of Professor Capeheart’s First Amendment claim by 
misapplying Garcetti’s “official duties” analysis and disregarding the express limits of Garcetti’s 
holding,” and urges the appellate court to overturn the district court’s holding.  The intent of 
AAUP’s brief is to highlight the academic freedom and First Amendment issues implicated by 
the case and to shine a light on the District Court’s harmful and incorrect decision.  The filed 
brief emphasizes that “the message of the district court’s ruling is chilling and clear: university 
administrators need not tolerate outspoken faculty dissent on matters of broad public concern or 
on the university’s institutional response to those concerns.” 
3. Demers v. Austin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60481 (E.D. Wash. June 2, 2011), appeal 
docketed, Demers v. Austin, No. 11-35558 (9
th
 Cir. July 1, 2011). 
 
Professor David Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University in 
1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999.  Demers taught journalism and mass communications 
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication.  Demers sued the 
university, alleging that it had retaliated against him for openly criticizing university practices.   
Specifically, Demers disagreed with certain practices and policies of the School of 
Communication.  Starting in 2008, Demers began to voice his criticism of the college and 
authored two publications called 7-Step Plan for Improving the Quality of the Edward R. 
Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower of Babel.  Demers claimed that the 
university retaliated against him by lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations 
and subjected him to an unwarranted internal audit in response to his open criticisms of 
administration decisions and because of his publications. 
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim, stating, primarily, that 
Demers made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member.  Unlike most 
cases involving free speech infringement at public universities, the district court’s analysis did 
not center on the language from Garcetti.  Instead, the court started its analysis by using a five 
part test set out by the Ninth Circuit in a series of public employee speech cases.2  After applying 
this analysis, the district court found that Demers was not speaking as a private citizen on matters 
of public concern, and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 
                                                          
2
The following inquiry is made to determine whether an employee’s First Amendment rights have been violated: 
“(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or 
public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 
employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from 
other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action 
even absent the protected speech.” 
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The district court did briefly mention Garcetti, but only used it to state that the “First 
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made 
pursuant to official responsibilities.”  The court then went on to apply a broad interpretation of a 
faculty member’s “official duties” while not considering whether its interpretation is practically 
applicable to academic settings.  The court explicitly stated that a faculty member’s duties range 
widely and include academic, administrative, and personnel functions.  The court further 
explained that speech regarding internal matters of the university is not of public concern, even 
though the college is a public institution. 
 Demers has appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit and the AAUP, 
jointly with The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, filed an amicus 
brief, arguing that Demers’ speech was related to his scholarship and other academic concerns.  
The AAUP believes that if the district court’s decision is allowed to stand, “it would have a 
chilling effect on research, innovation, and discourse within a public university – a place whose 
primary purpose is the development of knowledge through discussion, debate and inquiry.” 
4. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 265 P.3d 1144 (Idaho 2011), motion to stay denied, 
Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32985 (D. Idaho Mar. 12, 2012).  
 
In 2001, Civil Engineering Professor Habib Sadid published a letter to faculty and 
administrators, criticizing Idaho State University’s plan to merge two colleges, including the 
College of Engineering.  Several years later, he spoke to a state newspaper about the plan.  Sadid 
claimed that in retaliation for his comments, he did not receive faculty evaluations, was not 
appointed to a chair position, was defamed in an email, and received the lowest possible salary 
increase.  He, therefore, believed that his First Amendment rights had been violated and sued the 
university in state court.   
 
Invoking the decision in Hong v. Grant, the Idaho state trial court concluded that Sadid’s 
letters related to his personal grievances, rather than to a matter of public concern.  In addition, 
relying primarily on cases that arose outside of the academic context, the court reasoned that 
“government employers need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and 
actions.”  The court, therefore, disagreed with Sadid’s assertion that because his job description 
did not include writing letters to the newspaper critiquing the ISU administration, he was writing 
as a private citizen rather than as a public employee.  The court decided that the “tone” of 
Sadid’s letters “is that of an employee of ISU” and added that Sadid “should understand that he 
has limitations of his speech that he accepted when becoming a state employee.”  Finally, the 
court noted that Sadid had identified himself as an ISU employee in the published letters.  The 
court concluded that, “due to the tone and language of the letter,” Sadid was speaking as an 
employee and not as a private citizen and his comments were therefore not protected by the First 
Amendment. 
 
Professor Sadid appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Idaho, and the 
AAUP and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression filed an amicus 
brief in support of Sadid.  On November 30, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court’s dismissal of Sadid’s case, but rejected the trial court’s First Amendment analysis.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding that Sadid’s speech was made 
pursuant to his official duties and that the speech did not address a matter of public concern.  The 
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Supreme Court specifically found that there was “no evidence showing that Plaintiff’s official 
duties included making statements on behalf of the University regarding the subject matter of his 
letters, nor is there evidence that his employment responsibilities included creating the 
statements that were published in the newspaper.”  The court, therefore, concluded that Sadid’s 
speech was made as a private citizen.  The court further ruled that Sadid’s expressions of unease 
about the University’s treatment of the engineering program was a matter of public concern.  As 
such, Sadid’s speech deserved to be protected by the First Amendment.   
 
Unfortunately, the Idaho Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the trial court correctly 
dismissed Sadid’s case because he had failed to prove that the University took any adverse 
employment actions against him.  Professor Sadid is currently pursuing his First Amendment and 
Due Process claims in the federal courts. 
 
C. Extramural Speech  
 
1. Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2012) 
 
In this case, Teresa Wagner applied to become a Legal Analysis, Writing and Research 
(LAWR) instructor at Iowa University College of Law.  After failing to be hired as a fill-time 
instructor and also as an adjunct by the school, Wagner sued the law school’s dean, Carolyn 
Jones, in her official and individual capacities, for violating Wagner’s First Amendment right of 
political association. 
 
Wagner had graduated from Iowa University College of Law in 1993 and moved to 
Washington, DC shortly thereafter.  A self-proclaimed social conservative and registered 
Republican, Wagner worked with the National Right to Life Committee and the Family Research 
Council while in Washington.  She also taught legal research and writing at George Mason 
University School of Law for two years.  Upon moving back to Iowa, Wagner applied to become 
an LAWR instructor with the law school and was one of only three candidates interviewed in-
person for two open instructor positions.  Although receiving significant positive feedback 
throughout the process, Wagner states that she was told by an Associate Dean to conceal the fact 
that she had been offered a tenure-track position with the Ave Maria School of Law because it is 
viewed as a conservative school.  Wagner alleges that the faculty voted not to hire her for the 
instructor position and subsequent adjunct positions over a two year period because of her 
conservative political beliefs and association.   
 
The district court for the Southern District of Iowa summarily dismissed Wagner’s case, 
finding, primarily, that Dean Jones was reasonable in “accepting the faculty recommendation” 
and that a “vague message from Assistant Dean Carlson would surely not have” prompted Jones 
to believe “that a First Amendment…right had been implicated, let alone violated.” 
 
Wagner appealed the district court’s decision to the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals which 
overruled the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.   The Eight Circuit’s 
decision states that Wagner “need only prove that the employer’s discriminatory motive played a 
part in” the decision not to hire her.  The court also expressed that Dean Jones had a 
responsibility to ensure that the faculty “did not impermissibly consider Wagner’s politics in 
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making its recommendation as to whom she should hire…”  Therefore, because the facts of the 
case as alleged should be viewed in a light most favorable to Wagner, the Eight Circuit ruled that 
the case should be remanded back to the district court for further proceedings to determine 
whether or not Jones violated Wagner’s First Amendment rights by not hiring her as an 
instructor or as an adjunct. 
2. Heublein v. Wefald, et al., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (KS 2011). 
 
 John Heublein, a tenured professor of mathematics at Kansas State University – Salina, 
sued the university and several of his colleagues, alleging a number of violations of his protected 
rights, including his First Amendment free speech rights.  Heublein filed his lawsuit after he had 
been investigated because of a student’s complaint of sexual harassment.  The student’s 
allegations against Heublein included that he had made “sarcastic remarks” and “jokes about 
women” in her class.  During the course of its investigation, the university received reports from 
students and administrators that Heublein had “engaged in discourteous behavior towards 
students and faculty for many years.”  At the conclusion of the university’s investigation, the 
university ordered Heublein to develop a corrective action plan (CAP), submit student 
evaluations, seek counseling, and refrain from teaching summer school until the CAP 
requirement was fulfilled.  In response, Heublein filed an internal grievance and subsequently 
filed this lawsuit when the University ruled against him. 
  
 The district court dismissed all of Heublein’s claims, finding that he failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to support them.  What is most significant about the court’s decision, 
however, is how the court analyzed Heublein’s free speech claims.  Since Heublein alleged 
violations of two types of speech – in class and out of class speech – the district court proposed 
that each type of speech should be evaluated under a different test.  The court indicated that it 
believes the Tenth Circuit has developed a test for in-class speech, in the case of Miles v. Denver 
Public School, which applies to college and university professors and provides greater protection 
of speech than Garcetti.
3
   For Heublein’s out of class speech, the district court stated that it 
would need to apply the Garcetti test.   
  
 In analyzing Heublein’s in-class speech claim, the court noted that the key inquiry of the 
Miles test is “whether the actions taken by the college were reasonably related to [its] legitimate 
pedagogical interest.”  The court found that the university’s action of mandating a CAP for 
Heublein was “rationally related to its legitimate interest in the professionalism or conduct 
exhibited by its professors,” and therefore Heublein’s claim of retaliation for his in-class speech 
failed.  In analyzing Heublein’s out of class speech claim, which primarily related to his 
interactions with fellow faculty members and administrators, the court found that it did not meet 
the second prong of the Garcetti test in that it related to an internal personnel dispute or working 
conditions, as opposed to matters of public concern. 
 
                                                          
3
Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773 (10
th
 Cir. 1991) – This case involved a high school teacher who 
claimed that his school had violated his first amendment rights by taking action against him for comments he made 
in his classroom. 
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3. Appel v. Spiridon, 463 F. Supp. 2d 255 (D. Conn. 2006), rev’d, 531 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 
2008), sum. judgment granted/denied in part, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92363 (D. Conn. 
Aug. 18, 2011). 
 
This long-litigated and complex case involves numerous court decisions over a six-year 
period.  In summary, shortly after Rosalie Appel, a tenured professor of art at Western 
Connecticut State University (WCSU), cooperated in the investigation of a colleague’s claim of 
race discrimination, the university’s full-time art faculty signed a petition describing Appel’s 
behavior as “unprofessional,” “disruptive,” and “accusatory.”  A Special Assessment Committee 
(SAC) reviewed Appel’s behavior and recommended that she be given an “in-depth 
psychological assessment” before the next academic semester.  Appel refused to undergo the 
assessment and filed suit against four university administrators, alleging that the administrators’ 
conduct violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.  The 
administration notified her that she would be suspended without pay or benefits and banned from 
teaching if she declined to undergo the assessment; before the suspension took effect, Appel 
asked the court to prevent WCSU from requiring her to undergo the assessment.     
  
In November 2006, the federal district court in Connecticut issued an injunction 
prohibiting WCSU from requiring Appel to undergo a psychiatric exam in order to maintain her 
salary, benefits, or teaching position.  The court noted that no other WCSU faculty member had 
ever been ordered to undergo a psychiatric exam in order to keep teaching and receiving pay and 
benefits.  The court also determined that Appel may have been treated differently from other 
professors and that she was not given a chance to change her behavior before being required to 
undergo an evaluation.  This decision did not, however, affect other aspects of the remediation 
plan developed by the SAC, and Appel was informed that she could return to work as long as she 
complied with the other provisions of the plan. 
 
Appel returned to teaching during the spring semester of 2007, but issues between Appel 
and the university “rapidly escalated…and resulted in her eventual termination” in the spring of 
2008.  Prior to being terminated, Appel filed a second lawsuit against the university and various 
administrators, alleging that they violated her First Amendment speech rights and due process 
rights by imposing progressive discipline against her and by ordering her to submit to a 
psychiatric assessment in retaliation for her testimony in support of her colleague’s race 
discrimination claims.  After combining the multiple lawsuits, the district court has now ruled in 
relevant part that Appel’s claims for First Amendment retaliation and due process may proceed 
forward with respect to some, but not all, of the administrators involved in the SAC development 
and enforcement.  Most importantly, the court ruled that Appel’s testimony in support of her 
colleague’s racial discrimination case was speech made as a private citizen on a matter of public 
concern, and she should therefore be protected against retaliation by the First Amendment. 
 
4. Van Heerden v. Bd. of Sup. of La State Univ., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121414 (M.D. La. 
Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
 Ivor van Heerden, a coastal geologist and hurricane researcher, began his full-time 
faculty service at Louisiana State University (LSU) in 1992, when he was appointed as associate 
professor-research.  Van Heerden co-founded the LSU Hurricane Center in 2000 and was serving 
10
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as its deputy director when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in August 2005.  Following the 
storm, van Heerden was selected to head a group of scientists charged with investigating the 
causes of the extensive flooding in New Orleans.  As a result of his research, van Heerden began 
speaking out publicly about his concerns that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had failed to 
properly engineer the levees in New Orleans, causing a “catastrophic structural failure” which 
led to the city’s flooding.   
 
 In response to these comments, which they challenged, the LSU administration ordered 
van Heerden to stop making public statements and ultimately removed him from the group of 
scientists researching the New Orleans flooding.  In May 2006, van Heerden published The 
Storm in which he outlined his theories concerning the Army Corps’ role in the levee failures and 
exposed LSU’s efforts at silencing him.  LSU responded by further stripping him of his teaching 
duties and finally refused to renew his contract after nearly 20 years of employment with the 
university.  Following the termination of his services, van Heerden sued LSU for a variety of 
claims including defamation, retaliation based on his protected First Amendment speech, and 
breach of contract.   
 
 Through a series of decisions, the federal district court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana dismissed many of van Heerden’s claims, but on October 20, 2011, the court ruled that 
van Heerden could proceed with arguing that the administration’s action to terminate his 
appointment was in retaliation for his public comments about the culpability of the Army Corps 
of Engineers.  It is especially important to note that the court expressed particular concern about 
what it viewed as the misapplication of Garcetti’s principles to academic speech.  Specifically, 
the court stated that it “shares Justice Souter’s concern that wholesale application of the Garcetti 
analysis to the type of facts presented here could lead to a whittling-away of academics’ ability 
to delve into issues or express opinions that are unpopular, uncomfortable or unorthodox.  
Allowing an institution devoted to teaching and research to discipline the whole of the academy 
for their failure to adhere to the tenets established by university administrators will in time do 
much more harm than good.” 
 
D. Other Significant First Amendment Cases (not higher education related) 
 
1. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) 
 
The year’s discussion on free speech case law would not be complete without a 
discussion of Synder v. Phelps.  This extraordinarily controversial case received extensive media 
coverage and spurred heated debate and intense emotions.  In this case, the Supreme Court was 
asked to decide whether the First Amendment protects public protestors at a funeral from tort 
liability.   
 
On March 10, 2006, members of the Westboro Baptist Church picketed the funeral of 
U.S. Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder, who was killed in a non-combat-related 
vehicle accident in Iraq. The protestors held up signs opposing homosexuals and deploring the 
“sinful atmosphere” they allege is promoted by the United States government. Matthew Snyder’s 
father sued the church and the protestors, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
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Since the protestors had complied with local ordinances applicable to public protests, their First 
Amendment defense claim was the only issue the courts considered. 
 
A jury awarded Snyder $10.9 million for the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim.  Although reducing the award to $5 million, the federal District Court of Maryland upheld 
the jury’s decision, applying a balancing test in considering the First Amendment rights of the 
Westboro Baptist Church and the interest of Maryland in protecting its citizens against mental 
injury. The district court concluded that, while signs stating general points of view such as 
“Don't Pray for the USA” receive First Amendment protection, signs such as “You are going to 
Hell” specifically aimed at Matthew Snyder and his family created issues of fact for a jury to 
decide.  
  
The Fourth Circuit Court reversed the lower court’s decision holding that it was not the 
jury’s role to decide if the signs received constitutional protection. As a matter of law, Westboro 
Baptist Church’s speech was entitled to protection.  This position was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court who concluded that the church spoke on matters of public concern, and, therefore, its 
speech was protected by the First Amendment.  In the 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court stated 
that “[w]hile these messages [referring to the church member’s signs] may fall short of refined 
social or political commentary, the issues they highlight – the political and moral conduct of the 
United States and its citizens… – are matters of public import.”  The Court went on to note that 
the fact that the speech occurred at a private funeral did not change how the speech is viewed.  
The Westboro Baptist Church and its protesting members were afforded “'special protection' 
under the First Amendment and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the 
picketing was outrageous.”  
 
The Court concluded with the following words: “Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to 
action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and – as it did here – inflict great pain.  On 
the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have 
chosen a different course – to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do 
not stifle public debate.”  
 
III. FOIA/Subpoenas and Academic Freedom 
 
Over the last 18 months, FIOA requests have been rejuvenated as a method for targeting 
faculty who engage in “controversial” scholarship or research. While this method for obtaining 
information has a legitimate reason for its existence, certain groups and individuals have been 
using FIOA requests to intimidate faculty members and deter them from criticizing public policy 
or conducting research on heated issues.  In addition, the power of government subpoenas has 
been focused on academic research.  The Attorney General of Virginia has used his position to 
pursue his anti-climate change agenda, and the British government has used an international 
treatise to seek confidential research related to the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
The AAUP has taken an active public stance encouraging universities to limit their 
disclosure of academic information to what may be legally necessary and only if the requests for 
information are made for justifiable reasons.  The AAUP advocates for seeking a balance 
between the public’s right to know information and the protection of the academic freedom of 
those in higher education. 
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1. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. Cuccinelli, 80 Va. Cir. 657 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010); 
aff’d, sub nom. Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 2012 Va. LEXIS 47 
(Va. Mar. 2, 2012) 
In 2010, Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, who publicly opposes the theory of 
global warming, used his position to formally request emails and other documents relating to 
former faculty member and climatologist Michael Mann from the University of Virginia (UVA). 
Cuccinelli submitted the subpoena under authority he believed he held pursuant to the Virginia 
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA).  On August 30, 2010, a local Virginia judge ruled that 
while the Virginia Attorney General could investigate state grants awarded to scientists, 
Cuccinelli and his staff failed to demonstrate that such an investigation was warranted in this 
case. 
Cuccinelli appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the 
University of Virginia cross-appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in concluding that 
the university constitutes a “person” under the FATA and is therefore subject to a subpoena 
under the act.  In conjunction with the ACLU of Virginia, the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, the AAUP filed an 
amicus brief in the Supreme Court of Virginia opposing the subpoena.4  The brief argued, among 
other things, that Cuccinelli’s request was a cloaked attack on academic freedom and raised the 
concern that if Cuccinelli’s request was granted without any basis for suspicion of fraud, it may 
open the door for future fraud investigations to be directed solely at novel or unpopular scientific 
theories.  The brief pointed out that under the FATA statute, Cuccinelli must have a basis to 
believe that Mann committed fraud or that his emails while working at UVA would reveal 
evidence to support a concern of fraud.  It also noted that courts have recognized that doubts 
about the validity of scientific work are not equivalent to fraud.  The brief advocated that the 
Virginia Supreme Court consider First Amendment concerns in determining whether the 
information sought is sufficiently relevant to a false claims law investigation.  Academic 
freedom has been recognized by many courts as an important part of the First Amendment, and 
the court should weigh requiring UVA to comply with the subpoena against the importance of 
protecting academic freedom. 
 
On March 2, 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that state universities, as agencies 
of the Commonwealth, do not constitute a “person” under the FATA and therefore are not 
subject to subpoenas.  Because the FATA does not give the Attorney General authority to issue 
subpoenas to state universities, Cuccinelli’s appeal was rendered moot. 
 
Further fighting over Professor Mann’s records continues; see the short summary below 
regarding the FOI request made to UVA by the American Tradition Institute.   
                                                          
4
Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., Virginia Supreme Court Case No.:102359,  Brief for Amici 
Curiae American Association of University Professors, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, and Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Support of Affirmance, 
4/25/2011; (http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/D6CE857A-68C7-432A-BAA2-
1F2D1AF1811D/0/AmicusbrieftoVASupremeCourtApril252011.pdf- last accessed 3/21/2012) 
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2. IN RE: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom 
on Mutual Assistance in Matters of Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, U.S. 
M. D. Case No.: 11-MC-91078 (Boston College Subpoena) 
In May 2011, Boston College received a federal subpoena for oral-history materials held 
in its John J. Burns Library.  The subpoena was issued on behalf of the British government based 
on the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), which allows signing members to assist each 
other in international criminal investigations without going through diplomatic channels.  The 
materials sought included interviews of people who participated in the Northern Ireland conflict.   
Between 2001 and 2006, scholars at the college recorded detailed interviews with former 
loyalist and republican paramilitary members who fought in Northern Ireland; this project is 
known formally as the Belfast Project.  In order to make the interviewees in this project feel safe 
(which was necessary to get their cooperation), the researchers promised the interviewees 
anonymity until the interviewees’ death.    
Boston College complied with the subpoena for documents relating to Brendan Hughes, 
who is deceased, as doing so did not conflict with the confidentiality agreements.  However, the 
college asked the United States District Court in Boston to quash the subpoena as to records 
pertaining to the other still living interviewees on the grounds that release of the information 
could threaten the safety of interviewees, the continuing peace process in Northern Ireland, and 
the future of oral history.5  Boston College also argued that this type of forced disclosure could 
have a detrimental impact on academic freedom.  A major concern is that a lack of protection for 
interviewees in this type of oral-history project would greatly discourage people from giving 
future interviews about any controversial topic.   
The Justice Department filed a response to the motion to quash, dismissing academic 
freedom as a legally meaningless "quasi-privilege" and saying the college had offered "no claim 
of a cognizable federal privilege."6  The principal interviewers in the project, Ed Moloney and 
Anthony MacIntyre, together filed a motion to intervene in the case to protect the confidentiality 
of past and future contributors to the Belfast Project as well as their own safety. 
In this case of first impression in the First Circuit, the district court rendered an opinion 
in December 2011, holding that it had discretion to review a motion to quash a subpoena issued 
pursuant to an MLAT request under a reasonableness standard.  The court also ruled that “the 
compelling government interests inherent in an MLAT request” suggests that such a request 
                                                          
5
IN RE: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the United Kingdom on Mutual Assistance in Matters of Criminal Matters in the 
Matter of Dolours Price, U.S. M. D. Case No.: 11-MC-91078, Motion of Trustees of Boston College to Quash 
Subpoenas, 6/7/2011; (http://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/ecf_mad_uscourts_gov_doc1_09514330434.pdf - last 
accessed 3/6/2012). 
6
IN RE: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the United Kingdom on Mutual Assistance in Matters of Criminal Matters in the 
Matter of Dolours Price, U.S. M. D. Case No.: 11-MC-91078, Government’s Opposition to Motion to Quash and 
Motion for an Order to Compel, 7/1/2011;  (http://www.scribd.com/doc/59191594/Government-s-Opposition-to-
Motion-to-Quash-and-Motion-to-Compel-7-1-11 - last accessed 3/6/2012). 
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should “receive deference similar to grand jury subpoenae.”  The district court then found that 
while the First Circuit had previously recognized a protection of confidentiality for 
“academicians engaged in pre-publication research... commensurate to that which the law 
provides for journalists,” it had not decided that such protection is a legal privilege.   
The court looked at balancing the government’s need for the requested information 
against the potential harm to the free flow of information.  The court ultimately concluded that 
the government’s interest in complying with its treaty obligations as well as the public’s interest 
in legitimate criminal proceedings outweighed Boston College’s claims of confidentiality.  
Despite “credit[ing] Boston College and the Burns Library’s attempts to ensure the long term 
confidentiality of the Belfast project, as well as the potential chilling effects [of enforcing the 
subpoena] on academic research,” the court rejected Boston College’s motion to quash but did 
grant the college’s request for in-camera review.  The court also concluded that Ed Moloney and 
Anthony McIntyre’s interests were adequately represented by Boston College and denied their 
motion to intervene. 
Within days of this decision, the court conducted its review of thirteen interview 
transcripts.  Following this review, the court issued an order requiring Boston College to turn 
over the original materials to the federal government and provided that copies of the materials 
would be made and returned to the library archives.  Boston College and Moloney and McIntyre 
filed respective appeals with the First Circuit and requested a stay of the production of the 
records pending these appeals, which the district court has granted.  The ACLU has filed an 
amicus brief in support of Moloney and McIntyre, whose case is set for oral argument in April.  
The Boston College appeal may be heard in June.
7
  The AAUP strongly supports the position 
taken by Boston College.8 
3. FOI requests in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Virginia 
Over the course of spring of 2011, a number of public universities in three states faced 
Freedom of Information (FOI) or public records requests.  In Michigan, a conservative think tank 
called Mackinac Center for Public Policy submitted FOI requests to public universities, seeking 
emails sent by employees working at the universities’ centers on labor research.9  Specifically, 
the FIO requested production of emails containing the words “Madison,” “Wisconsin,” “Scott 
Walker” (Wisconsin's governor), or “Maddow” in reference to MSNBC talk show host Rachel 
Maddow, who reported on the controversy affecting Wisconsin unions. The requests were 
intended to find evidence that professors had violated a Michigan law barring state employees 
from using state-funded resources, like their work email, for partisan political purposes.  
                                                          
7
 http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/ 
8
“Oral History ,Unprotected”, Scott Jaschik,  Inside Higher Ed (7/5/2011) 
(http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/05/federal_government_questions_confidentiality_of_oral_history -
last accessed 3/6/2012) 
9“Michigan Think Tank Asks 3 Universities for Labor Professors' Emails.” Peter Schmidt, The Chronicle, 
(3/29/2011)              
   (http://chronicle.com/article/Michigan-Think-Tank-Asks-3/126922/ - last accessed 3/6/2012)  
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 In Wisconsin, the state Republican Party filed a FOI request with the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison, seeking emails containing a wide range of terms, including the word 
“Republican,” sent by Professor William Cronon a history professor.10  Legal counsel for the 
university wrote a letter in response to the request, noting the overly broad reach and vagueness 
of the request.  The letter explained that the university would not provide the Republican Party 
with emails that were obviously irrelevant.  For example, the request asked for all emails that 
contained the word “union” but the university did not provide emails that referred to the 
“European Union” or “Memorial Union.”  Also, the university stated that it would take into 
account privacy and other statutory considerations when limiting which materials it would 
handover and it would balance the public’s right to know against academic freedom 
considerations.  The university explained that “[s]cholars and scientists pursue knowledge by 
way of open intellectual exchange. Without a zone of privacy within which to conduct and 
protect their work, scholars would not be able to produce new knowledge or make life-enhancing 
discoveries.”  The letter further remarked that “[h]aving every exchange of ideas subject to 
public exposure puts academic freedom in peril and threatens the processes by which knowledge 
is created.” 
Finally, the American Tradition Institute served a FOI request on the University of 
Virginia, mirroring the subpoena filed by Attorney General Cuccinelli.  Unfortunately, UVA first 
agreed to release the requested materials by the middle of August 2012 per court order.11  In its 
public statements, the university acknowledged that some of the materials are protected by 
statutory exemptions and that while the ATI would receive those documents, ATI was prohibited 
from revealing the contents unless given permission by the court.  Subsequent to this decision 
and public announcement, the university appealed the court order requiring production.  
Professor Michael Mann sought to intervene in the appeal arguing that the emails in question 
were his and he therefore should have standing in any litigation relevant to their release.  The 
AAUP submitted a letter to the 35
th
 Judicial Circuit Court of Virginia in support of Mann’s 
intervention, and the court has granted him standing.  The appellate court is now considering 
whether ATI is entitled to see the documents even if protected from disclosure to others. 
The AAUP and other interested parties, such as the ACLU and the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, have sent letters to the relevant institutions, expressing concerns about the impact that 
these requests could have on academic freedom.12  The AAUP has applauded the response of the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison and has urged the other universities to use caution when 
considering the information requests, warning that releasing emails from professors speaking 
their minds would produce a chilling effect on the free exchange of ideas in the academic setting.  
 
                                                          
10“Wisconsin GOP Seeks Emails of a Madison Professor Who Criticized the Governor,” Peter Schmidt, The 
Chronicle (3/25/2011) (http://chronicle.com/article/Wisconsin-GOP-Seeks-Emails-of/126911/ - last accessed 
3/6/2012) 
11“Court orders U.Va. to turn over climate scientist records under seal in denialist FOIA harassment request,” 
Climate Science Watch (5/26/2011) (http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2011/05/26/court-orders-uvirgini-to-turn-
over-climate-scientist-records-under-seal-in-denialist-foia-harassment-request/ - last accessed 3/6/2012) 
12
See:  http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/12187ECD-37AB-4938-8305-
17086A59BDA1/0/LettertoUVAApril142011.pdf (last accessed 3/6/2012) 
16
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 7 [2012], Art. 29
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss7/29
  17 
 
IV. Tenure and Due Process 
 
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract 
 
Several tenure cases this year hinged upon the issue of whether faculty handbooks are 
contracts and to what extent do the provisions of the handbook bind the college or university 
regarding tenure review processes. 
 
1. Howard University v. Sybil Roberts-Williams, --- A.3d ----, 2012 WL 573161 (D.C.) 
 
Professor Sybil Roberts-Williams was hired as a temporary lecturer by Howard 
University in the Department of Theatre Arts in 1993.  In 1998, she assumed a tenure-track 
position as a probationary instructor.  Roberts-Williams was promoted to assistant professor in 
2001 and applied for tenure on October 15, 2004.  At the direction of the Chairperson of her 
department’s Appointment, Promotion, and Tenure Committee (APT), Roberts-Williams 
submitted a revised application in November 2004.   
 
Robert-Williams was notified that her application had been rejected by the APT 
Committee in mid-November and she formally requested reconsideration of her application at 
that time.  On December 16, 2004, Roberts-Williams was notified in writing that the APT 
Committee denied her application for tenure and recommended that she be granted a special 
appointment for the 2005-2006 academic year which would be her “terminal” appointment.  In 
its explanatory letter, the APT Committee noted that her application for tenure had been denied 
due to her lack of publication, some student comments regarding “confusion” about her 
methodology, and concerns about her “collegiality” due to her limited support for departmental 
productions other than her own. 
 
After she received her final tenure denial from the university provost in December 2005, 
Professor Roberts-Williams sued the university in state court, alleging violations of the District 
of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) as well as breach of contract.  After an eight day trial, 
the jury rejected Roberts-Williams’ DCHRA claims entirely, but ruled in her favor regarding her 
breach of contract claim.  Specifically, the jury found that the university had violated the faculty 
handbook provisions requiring biennial evaluations of all faculty members (Roberts-Williams 
had not received any) and that the university had not followed the proper procedure in its 
handbook for tenure denial reconsideration.  The trial court subsequently denied a post-verdict 
motion by the university and upheld the jury’s award of $250,060 for loss of “back pay” and 
$332,340 for loss of “future pay.” 
 
Howard University and Professor Roberts-Williams cross-appealed the jury’s award, and 
the trial court’s decisions on various issues to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.  On 
February 23, 2012, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s decision and jury award in Roberts-
Williams’ favor.  In the decision’s most relevant part, the court agreed with the trial court that 
the faculty handbook was a contract that required the university to conduct biennial evaluations.  
The fact that individual faculty members could seek guidance from their peers or colleagues with 
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greater experience did not abdicate the university’s affirmative responsibility to conduct those 
required evaluations which could assist faculty in their development for obtaining tenure.   
 
Since the appeals court’s decision did not disturb the jury’s damages award, it did not 
address the merits of Professor Roberts-Williams cross-appeal. 
 
2. Rafalko v. University of New Haven, et al., 129 Conn. App. 44, 19 A.3d 215 (2011) 
 Professor Rafalko, an associate professor in the University of New Haven’s department 
of visual and performing arts and philosophy, sued the university for breach of contract, breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent misrepresentation after he was denied 
tenure.  Rafalko also sued the university and his department chair for defamation in connection 
with a letter his chair wrote to the tenure and promotion review committee and which Rafalko 
claimed diminished the value of his academic work-product.  The Appellate Court of 
Connecticut upheld the trial court’s dismissal of all of Rafalko’s claims on the grounds that he 
did not present sufficient evidence to support them.   
As the primary basis for his first three claims, Rafalko argued that the faculty handbook 
required his department chair to give him annual reviews to assist him in obtaining tenure, but 
that his chair failed to do so in the years 1999-2003.  The university contended that it denied 
Rafalko tenure due to his failure to publish an adequate number of scholarly works and that 
Rafalko did not receive the annual reviews because he failed to timely prepare a self-evaluation, 
which was the first to step to initiate the annual review process.  In affirming the trial court’s 
summary judgment dismissal, the appellate court reiterated the Connecticut supreme court’s 
position that a faculty handbook that “sets forth terms of employment may be considered a 
binding employment contract,” but also concluded that the evidence “unequivocally” showed 
that Rafalko knew of the publication requirements for tenure and that the annual reviews would 
not have provided him any additional information on that requirement.  Therefore, the court 
ruled that the lack of annual reviews was not material to Rafalko’s claims.    
 On the issue of defamation, the appellate court found that Rafalko had failed to present 
evidence of false statements within his chair’s letter to the tenure and promotion committee.  The 
court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning that the department chair was entitled to his opinion 
of Rafalko’s publications and reiterated that a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing a 
mere opinion, no matter how “unreasonable the opinion or vituperous the expressing of it may 
be.”  The appellate court also concurred with the trial court’s reasoning that “[t]o deem such an 
opinion as defamatory would have the court cross the bounds of academic freedoms that are 
protected under the first amendment.”  
3. Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 62 So. 3d 907 (Miss. 2011) 
Professor Melissa Whiting, an assistant professor in USM’s Department of Curriculum, 
Instruction and Special Education in the College of Education and Psychology, sued the 
university after being denied tenure and having her contract “nonrenewed.”  Whiting sued the 
university, claiming that she was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the Board of Trustees of the university refused to rule timely on her application and did not grant 
her tenure.  Whiting also claimed the University violated their contractual obligations by not 
giving her a fair hearing. 
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A federal district court and the Fifth Circuit both ruled against Whiting regarding her 
constitutional claims.  The Fifth Circuit found that Whiting had failed to meet her burden of 
showing that she was deprived of constitutionally protected property and liberty interests.  The 
only remaining issues to be resolved were Whiting’s claims under state law.  Among the many 
issues involved, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether the expectation of tenure 
creates a property interest for professors and whether a  faculty manual provides a contractually 
guaranteed right to due process for public universities.  The faculty handbook of the school 
provides tenure process and states that “these procedures collectively constitute contractual due 
process.”   
In short, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Whiting, finding that under state 
law and Fifth Circuit precedent no contract was formed between the university and Whiting.  The 
court further ruled that written policies of employers do not, “of themselves, create or confer an 
expectation of continued employment.”  The court, therefore, reasoned that the university had 
not violated Whiting’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution because 
she had no “legitimate expectation of employment…that creates a protected interest.”   
B. Due Process 
 
Two different federal circuit courts looked at whether Due Process protections are 
implicated regarding the status of Department Chair.  In each case, the courts ruled against the 
faculty member terminated from the position and in favor of the institution taking the action, but 
for different reasons.  Of particular interest is the Eighth Circuit’s determination that a faculty 
member did not have a property interest in his position as Department Chair.  
 
1. Collins v. University of New Hampshire, 664 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2011) 
In the summer of 2007, while tenured Professor John Collins was the Chair of the 
Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, he was arrested and charged with stalking 
and disorderly conduct after “unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he 
suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket.”  Collins self-reported his conduct, 
observed by multiple witnesses, to the Dean of the College of Life Sciences and Agriculture 
(COLSA) at approximately the same time as it was reported to the campus police by one of the 
witnesses.  The day after the incident, Collins was arrested by campus police and subsequently 
banned from campus, placed on paid administrative leave, and suspended as chair.   
 
After being cleared of all charges in December 2007, Collins was reinstated to his 
tenured faculty position at the university, but he was not returned as chair of the department.  
Collins subsequently sued the university and several administrators alleging that his due process 
rights had been violated because the university failed to provide him with a pre-deprivation 
hearing before he was suspended, banned from campus, and removed as chair of the department. 
Collins also alleged that the university and the administrators had defamed him when it emailed 
notification to faculty and staff that he had been banned from campus. 
 
The district court dismissed the case for several reasons.  First, the court found that the 
University had not violated Collins’ due process rights in that he was not entitled to a pre-
suspension hearing because he was suspended with pay.  Second, the court ruled that even if he 
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had an enforceable liberty interest in access to campus, Collins was not deprived of such interest 
because the ban was temporary, associated with his suspension, and subject to exceptions that 
included allowing him access onto campus several times over the fall semester for activities 
related to his children. Third, the district court found that Collins had not been improperly 
deprived of his property interest in the position of chair because the university had accorded him 
adequate due process after his initial suspension, including multiple meetings with the Provost 
and an opportunity to respond in writing to all of the decisions related to his arrest.  Finally, the 
district court found that the university’s email notification to faculty and staff was not 
defamation because it was substantially true given Collins’ actions and statements. 
 
Collins appealed the district court’s decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals which 
upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case, ruling that Collins had been provided with 
adequate notice and process to respond to his suspension with pay, campus ban, and removal 
from the position of chair during the two month period following the initial suspension.  The 
court also found that the university acted lawfully and without malice in notifying faculty and 
staff about Collins’ ban from campus and therefore were not liable for defamation. 
 
2. Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2011) 
Tenured professor Sean Mulvenon sued the University of Arkansas, alleging that his 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when his chaired position was not 
extended, despite the fact that the university has a procedure for renewing the contract.  The 
Eighth Circuit held that a professor does not hold a property right to a chaired position even if 
there is a set procedure for renewing a faculty member’s position.  
 Mulvenon had a contract with the university that granted him a five year position as 
holder of the George M. and Boyce W. Billingsley Chair for Education Research and Policy 
Studies. According to his contract, if Mulvenon showed interest in renewing his contract, a 
review committee of faculty members external to the University of Arkansas would evaluate his 
performance and provide recommendations to the department head and the dean. The 
Reappointment Guidelines stated that the department head and the dean would make the final 
decision regarding the reappointment. Despite the fact that his recommendation letters were all 
favorable, the dean decided to not renew Mulvenon’s contract, contending that Mulvenon had 
not fulfilled the expectations of the position (the department head excused himself from the 
evaluation process).  
 Mulvenon argued that his appointment letter, which indicated a process for renewing his 
contract, created a property interest in the position protected by federal due process.  Mulvenon 
further argued that this expectation of a property interest in the position is supported by the 
detailed Reappointment Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit rejected Mulvenon’s arguments, finding 
that his appointment letter did not create a valid property interested in his reappointment to the 
position and that he could not “rely on the procedures governing his possible reappointment to 
create a property interest where none otherwise existed.”  The circuit court, therefore, concluded 
that the university had not violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
  
V. Discrimination and Affirmative Action  
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions 
20
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 7 [2012], Art. 29
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss7/29
  21 
Last year, two federal circuit courts upheld university admissions programs that, to some 
extent, considered race as a factor.  One of those cases has been appealed to the Supreme Court 
which has granted certiorari with argument scheduled for the fall. 
 
1. Fisher v. University of Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. 
LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012)  
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that the University of Texas (UT) system’s admissions 
policy which incorporated an affirmative action plan was constitutional.  The admission policy 
was challenged by two Texas residents who were denied undergraduate admission to the 
University of Texas at Austin.  The district court found no legal liability and ruled in favor of the 
university.  The case was then appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 
In 1997, the UT system replaced an earlier admissions plan which had explicitly 
considered race with a “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI).  The PAI is produced through a 
holistic review of applications intended to identify students whose achievements are not 
accurately reflected by their test scores and grades alone.  The PAI includes an evaluation of 
required written essays and a “personal achievement score” which is made up of factors such as 
socio-economic status, languages at home, and whether the student lives in a single-parent 
household.  In addition, the state legislature and the university adopted a variety of other 
initiatives to increase diversity, including scholarship programs, high school outreach and 
recruitment, and the “Top Ten Percent Law,” under which all high school seniors in the top ten 
percent of their class at the time of application are guaranteed admission to a state university.
13
  
The top ten percent rule accounts for 92% of the in-state students that are admitted to UT. 
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Fifth Circuit in support of the UT system.  
Specifically, the brief focused on the benefits of a diverse student body and pointed out that the 
University of Texas specifically modeled its admissions policy on a similar policy endorsed by 
the Supreme Court. The brief also argued that academic freedom depends on the right of 
universities to freely choose who is admitted to their communities because universities have the 
educational expertise to design and fulfill their own academic missions. 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Fifth Circuit 
ruled in favor of the university, pointing out three objectives of promoting diversity among 
universities in the Texas system: 1) increased perspectives inside and outside the classroom, 2) 
better preparation to act as professionals, and 3) increased civic engagement.
14
  The circuit court 
                                                          
13
 The law was recently been amended to limit the number of freshmen that UT must admit under the law to 75% of 
its overall freshman class.  At the time the plaintiffs applied to UT, however, this change was not yet in effect.  
 
14
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative action admissions policy 
of the University of Michigan Law School. The law school’s admissions policy sought to obtain a “critical mass" of 
minority students in order to promote a diverse student body. The Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause did not prohibit a university's "narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." Under Grutter, a university 
could seek to increase diversity, but only through a holistic, flexible, and individualized program but not via the use 
of quotas, separate admissions tracks, or a fixed set of points to minority applicants. The Grutter court embraced that 
diversity in educational bodies is a legitimate government interest. 
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noted that after it previously struck down the university’s prior race-based admissions system, 
minority applications and enrollment plunged, prompting Texas to pass the Top Ten Percent 
Law.  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the university has “a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits of diversity.”  The court acknowledged that educational institutions are 
unique and that courts should review the constitutionality of university admissions methods 
specifically through an academic prism.  The court articulated that universities should be given 
special deference for two reasons: 1) these decisions are a product of “complex educational 
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university” and 2) 
“universities occupy a special place in our constitutional tradition.”  The court then granted the 
university deference in this case, stating that it made an “educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational mission” because of “its experience and expertise, that a 
'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in 
securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body." The court did caution that while 
diversity is a legitimate goal, schools may not engage in racial balancing or design admissions 
policies to achieve a specific percentage of minority students.    
The Fifth Circuit’s decision has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court which 
has granted certiorari.  The AAUP is now considering submitting an amicus brief to the Supreme 
Court in support of the UT system’s admissions program.  
2. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607 
(6th Cir. 2011) 
In this case decided by the Sixth Circuit, the court struck down a voter-initiated 
amendment to the Michigan Constitution called Proposal 2.  The constitutional amendment 
prohibited the state’s public colleges and universities from granting “preferential treatment to [] 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.”  The Sixth 
Circuit held that Proposal 2 was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Specifically, the court determined that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits the formation of "a political structure that treats all individuals as 
equals, yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens 
on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation." 
While courts usually do not interfere with changes in political power made according to 
neutral principles, such as the creation of voting jurisdictions, they apply a stricter analysis and 
scrutiny when a law is created with the explicit consideration of race.  Indeed, the court noted 
that “[e]nsuring a fair political process is nowhere more important than in education.  Education 
is the bedrock of equal opportunity and ‘the foundation of good citizenship.’”  In this instance, 
Proposal 2 created a situation where proponents of race-conscious admissions practices must not 
only convince university administrators to adopt and use such policies, but they also must amend 
the constitution in order for the policies to be legal.  Therefore, in analyzing Proposal 2, the court 
found that the voter-initiated amendment “works as a reallocation of political power or 
reordering of the political process to place 'special burdens' on racial minorities” in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
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The U.S. Supreme Court handed down several decisions last year that do not necessarily 
address issues in academia, but still have the potential for affecting faculty and academic 
professionals in employment cases.  In addition to the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), which we reported on last year, the 
Supreme Court also decided the following case concerning Title VII’s protection against 
discrimination. 
 
1. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) 
 In Staub v. Proctor, the Supreme Court confirmed that the “Cat’s Paw” theory of 
employer liability applies to some employment discrimination claims.  The term “Cat’s Paw” is 
used in employment cases to describe a situation where an employee, without formal authority to 
alter the terms and conditions of employment of another employee, takes action (such as 
supplying inaccurate information to a decision-maker) to influence a decision-maker in a manner 
that results in an adverse employment decision being made.  Under this theory, an employee who 
has been adversely impacted by an employer’s decision can prevail in a discrimination suit even 
if the employer can successfully establish that the actual decision-maker harbored no 
discriminatory animosity against the employee.  The suing employee will prevail if s/he is able to 
show that the decision-maker’s decision was influenced by another employee who did harbor an 
unlawful discriminatory animosity.  
 In Staub, a hospital employee was a member of the Army Reserve and had to miss work 
due to military obligations.  Staub’s immediate supervisors were hostile to his military 
obligations and placed work requirements upon him that were beyond the policies of the 
hospital.  His supervisor further issued a “corrective action” disciplinary warning against him 
and then fabricated a report, sent to the hospital’s vice president of human resources,  that stated 
Staub had violated this “corrective action.”  After reviewing his personnel file, the vice president 
fired Staub in light of his perceived failure to follow directions. Staub sued, claiming the hospital 
discriminated against him for being a member of the military.  
 The hospital claimed that the vice president’s decision to fire Staub was motivated by the 
false report and not by Staub’s membership in the Army Reserve.  The Supreme Court, however, 
held that the hospital is still liable for unlawful discrimination because the ultimate decision 
maker’s judgment was influenced by the immediate supervisors’ animosity towards military 
personnel.  The Court reasoned that even though the vice president of human resources held no 
grievance against the military, the animosity held by Staub’s supervisors was a proximate cause 
of the vice president’s decision because he based his decision on reports written with 
discriminatory motivation. 
 
C. Age Discrimination  
 
In a recent age discrimination case, a faculty member was not able to prove that he had 
been discriminated against due to his age, but was able to prove that he had been retaliated 
against by his institution because he filed a discrimination complaint.   
 
1. Klebe v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23182 (5th 
Cir. 2011).  
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 Professor Robert Klebe, a tenured faculty member in the Department of Cellular and 
Structural Biology, filed a lawsuit against the University of Texas Health Sciences Center for 
retaliation after he received negative post-tenure reviews shortly after he filed an age 
discrimination complaint with the university.   
 In 1998, the university notified all tenured faculty members in Klebe’s department that 
they would have to secure outside funding for their individual research projects.  Klebe objected 
to this requirement and ultimately failed to secure external funding for his research.  As a result, 
Klebe’s salary was reduced by 25%.  Less than six months after his salary was reduced, Klebe 
filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that his age was the motivating factor behind the 
university’s actions.  Specifically, Klebe alleged that his salary had been reduced in order to fund 
salaries for younger faculty due to an ongoing budgetary freeze on the funds to hire new faculty.  
Shortly after filing his age discrimination complaint, Klebe began receiving negative post-tenure 
review evaluations.  In response to all of the above, Klebe filed suit against the university in the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging age discrimination for reducing his 
salary and retaliation for the negative post-tenure evaluations.   
 In separate consecutive proceedings, two juries found that while the university had not 
discriminated against Klebe because of his age, there was sufficient evidence to show that the 
university would not have given Klebe negative evaluations but for his filing a discrimination 
complaint.  Klebe was awarded $900,000 by the first jury and, after a partial re-trial, a second 
jury awarded him $400,000.  The university appealed those judgments to the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals where the court upheld the second jury’s damage award.  In its decision, the court 
found that there was sufficient evidence to support two juries finding that a causal connection 
existed between Klebe’s discrimination complaint and the negative post-tenure reviews and that 
there was sufficient evidence of mental anguish to uphold the damages awarded by the second 
jury. 
 
VI. Intellectual Property 
There were many developments this year concerning the legal issues surrounding patent 
and copyright in academia.  Those developments include two significant U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions and a new federal intellectual property law.   
A. Patent and Copyright Cases 
 
1. Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).  
Originally filed as a patent infringement lawsuit by Stanford University against Roche 
Molecular Systems, Inc., this complex case evolved through litigation into a broader battle over 
the patent rights of faculty members to their inventive work.  Specifically, the case ended up 
centering on the dispute over who owns the patent rights to inventions developed in academia 
and funded, fully or partially, through federal government grants.   
 
In support of its patent infringement claims, Stanford University asked the Supreme 
Court to interpret the federal Bayh-Dole Act as automatically taking ownership rights away from 
inventing faculty members and vesting that ownership interest in the faculty members’ college or 
university whenever federal research funds are involved.  Enacted in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act 
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was intended to address concerns about government funding agencies’ inability to efficiently 
transition publicly funded research from development to application for the benefit of society.  
Thirty years of practice under the Bayh-Dole Act has seen great improvement in moving 
academic inventions from the research to application phase to enable public use.  The act, did 
not, however, create an automatic assignment or rights as Stanford argued. 
 
Strongly believing that Stanford’s interpretation would contradict existing patent law, 
was counter to the process of patent assignment that has worked successfully under the Bayh-
Dole Act during the thirty years of its existence, and would harmfully impact faculty inventors, 
the AAUP filed a joint amicus brief, written in coordination with the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE-USA) and IP Advocate, a non-profit advocacy group.  The joint 
brief endorsed the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act and argued that it was unnecessary and likely 
harmful for the law to be reinterpreted to seize ownership rights from faculty researchers.  The 
brief emphasized that the act does not alter the basic ownership rights granted by law to faculty 
inventors who may then assign rights to their college or university by contract.  
In addition, the joint brief strongly rejected an argument made by Stanford and other 
universities and higher education associations that faculty researchers are employees who have 
been hired to invent and therefore are not entitled to ownership of the products of their inventive 
research.  As the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure states, faculty “are the appointees, but not in any proper sense the employees of [the 
university trustees].”  Historically and legally, academic researchers and inventors are, and 
always have been, much more than mere employees to their institutions.  As such, the brief 
argues, Stanford’s attempt to analogize the copyright “work for hire” doctrine fails not only 
because such a concept does not exist in the Patent Act, but also because faculty are not just 
employees of the institution.   
On June 6, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 opinion, held that inventors who create 
with the aid of federal funding do not automatically give up their patent rights.  The Court 
rejected Stanford’s arguments and, instead, chose to follow the plain meaning of the Bayh-Dole 
Act’s terms and emphasized that the Act did not overturn two centuries of patent law which 
supports the principle that an inventor has a right to retain the patent to his or her invention.   
   
2. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
The main issue in this case concerned whether Congress had, through passage of Section 
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, violated the First Amendment’s Free Expression 
Clause by retroactively awarding copyright protection to various foreign works that had 
previously been in the public domain in the United States.  
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act implements Article 18 of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  Article 18 requires that 
signatories, which include the United States, provide the same copyright protection to authors in 
other member countries as it provides to its own authors.  Section 514 extended the copyright 
protection of some foreign works whose copyright protections had not expired in their base 
country.  The result of this provision was to retroactively apply copyright protection to some 
foreign works that had previously been open for use by anyone in the United States.  The ripple 
effect was felt strongly in academia.  Although the plaintiffs in this case represent a wide variety 
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of organizations and individuals, the named plaintiff is Professor Lawrence Golan from the 
University of Denver.  Golan, an orchestral professor and conductor, often relies on public 
domain music when teaching his orchestral students and when performing as a conductor with 
the student orchestra.  Golan and the other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act, 
claiming that it violates their First Amendment free expression rights in that it is too broad and 
unnecessarily undermines their reliance on the previously public domain works.  Golan also 
argued that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Copyright Act when it enacted Section 
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado first held that Section 514 of the 
URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment.  With respect to Golan's 
First Amendment challenge, the court stated that it saw "no need to expand upon the settled rule 
that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment 
concerns."  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
initial decision in part and reversed in part.  The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does 
not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court’s 
First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.  On remand, the district court 
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that Section 514’s “constriction of the 
public domain was not justified by any of the asserted federal interests.”  On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the district court ruling that Section 514 was “narrowly tailored to fit the 
important government aim of protecting U.S. copyright holders’ interests abroad.”  
The plaintiffs appealed the Tenth Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court.  
On January 18, 2012, in a 6-2 opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit’s decision.  
Specifically, the Court agreed that Congress had not exceeded its authority under the Copyright 
Clause and that it had not violated the First Amendment by allowing for the copyright restoration 
authorized by Section 514.  The Court emphasized that Section 514 “leaves undisturbed the 
idea/expression distinction and the fair use defense” which users of “certain foreign works” may 
continue to use. 
The impact of this decision could be significant in higher education. Like Professor 
Lawrence Golan, many faculty members rely on public domain material for their work. The 
licensing fees that universities will have to pay in order to use foreign artistic material that was 
previously in the public domain may be a substantial deterrent to continuing programs that rely 
on the newly protected material.  A likely result will be the stifling of faculty and student 
creative expression.   
 
B. Legislation 
 
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Public Law 112-29, 124 Stat. 284 (2011) 
 
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA).  The published intent of this law is to reduce patent backlog at the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO); foster innovation through improved patent quality; and, better 
harmonize U.S. patent laws with those of other countries.   
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Although certain portions of the AIA were effective immediately, most of the provisions 
will be phased in over the coming year with final implementation occurring in March 2013.  The 
law has the potential to have broad reaching affects to both patent applicants and patent holders.  
The following summarizes a few of the most significant changes important to the higher 
education community: 
 First-to-File – in March 2013, the U.S. will join most other countries in the 
global community in moving from granting patents in a “first-to-invent” to a 
“first-to-file” system.  Under the existing “first-to-invent” system, deciding 
whether an invention was new or not obvious involved determining the state of 
the art at the time the invention was conceived, not at the time the application was 
filed. Under the AIA’s “first-to-file” system, the decision will be based on what is 
determined to be state of the art when the application is filed.  The date of 
invention will no longer be relevant in determining what is prior art against future 
applications 
o There is, however, a limited one-year grace period related to public 
disclosures made by the inventor.  Such disclosure evidence could 
potentially include presentations at an academic conference or the 
publication of a scholarly article.  It remains to be seen how scholarly 
disclosure will factor into the new patent application process and the 
granting of rights.  There is also the chance that such information could be 
used to by other researchers to build on the work and file first. 
 Post Grant Review – There will now be two separate avenues to challenge issued 
patents.  The first process, an “inter partes” review, permits allegations of 
invalidity over prior art as the basis for a challenge.  The second process, a “post-
grant” review, permits a patent to be challenged on any ground during the first 
nine months of the patent’s issuance.   
 Filing Fees – The USPTO will be completely overhauling its fee structure in the 
coming year.  In the meantime, from September 2011 until the new fee structure 
is in place, virtually all patent fees will carry a 15% surcharge.  In addition, 
certain types of patent applications may receive “Prioritized Review” for an 
additional fee.  This “Prioritized Review” will be granted to a limited number of 
applications annually.   
  
We anticipate that many institutions will be reviewing and revising their intellectual 
property and patent filing policies over the next two years as the USPTO develops rules and 
regulations to implement the new patent system.  Considering the implications on both scholarly 
enterprise and financial remuneration, it is extremely important that faculty be actively involved 
in the process of reviewing and revising their institutional policies and understanding how their 
disclosures through scholarly activities may affect their patent rights, both within the U.S. and 
abroad. 
 
VII. Union/Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues 
A. Arbitration  
At the same time it partially rejects an arbitrator’s decision, the Ohio Court of Appeals 
rules that there is a high bar to meet in order to overturn an arbitrator’s decision. 
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1. Kent State Univ. v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 2011 Ohio 5597 (Ohio Ct. App., 2011)   
 
The Kent State Chapter of the AAUP filed grievances on behalf of two faculty members 
who were denied tenure by the President of Kent State University.  Those grievances eventually 
went before an arbitrator who found in favor of the faculty members and recommended two 
remedies: 1) that the President “reevaluate” the substantive academic judgment behind his 
decision to deny tenure to both professors; and 2) that the university provide compensation to the 
two faculty members “no greater than would have resulted had there been no violation” of the 
relevant CBA.  The university appealed both provisions of the arbitrator’s decision to the trial 
court in Ohio.  The trial court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision, and the university appealed the 
trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals of Ohio. 
 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated that “[a]n arbitrator is the final judge of law and 
facts… [and] that judicial intervention should be resisted even where the arbitrator has made 
“serious” “improvident” or “silly” errors.”  Using this standard, the appellate court partially 
upheld and partially rejected the arbitrator’s decision in this case.  First, the court held that the 
trial court did not err in finding that the arbitrator’s decision was correct as to the interpretation 
of the procedures set forth in the CBA regarding the President’s denial tenure.  Specifically, the 
appellate court ruled that the arbitrator could reasonably conclude that the relevant CBA 
provision required the President to provide detailed reasons for declining to accept [an internal 
appeals committee] recommendation to grant tenure.  Therefore, the arbitrator’s ruling that the 
President be required to “reevaluate” his decision and provide specific written reasons as to why 
he does not accept the recommendation of the committee if he again concludes that tenure should 
not be granted to the two faculty members was appropriate. 
 
With regard to the arbitrator’s decision granting compensation to the two faculty 
members, the appellate court reversed the trial court decision and ruled that the court erred in not 
acknowledging the material mistake made by the arbitrator in exceeding his authority by 
granting a monetary remedy.  Specifically, the appellate court found that the arbitration process 
outlined in the section of the CBA under which these grievances were brought provided that the 
arbitrator’s “sole authority” in awarding a remedy was to send the matter back to the level of 
review in which the procedural error or omission occurred.  Since the arbitrator was precluded 
from granting monetary relief by that section of the CBA (as opposed to other grievance sections 
of the CBA), the appellate court ordered that portion of the arbitrator’s award to be vacated. 
B. State Labor Laws 
The last year has seen a significant trend towards anti-labor legislation in the states.  
While some of the proposed bills and enacted laws may not outlaw unions completely, the efforts 
are definitely targeted at limiting the effects of collective bargaining in many states. 
  
1. Wisconsin Senate Bill 11 
Following heated debate and difficulty achieving a necessary quorum in the Wisconsin 
senate, Wisconsin Senate Bill 11 was signed into law by Governor Scott Walker on March 11, 
2011.  As passed, the law requires state employees to contribute a percentage of their own 
salaries to their pension and health care premiums and eliminates the ability of public employee 
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union members to collectively negotiate anything but wage increases, which would be capped by 
the Consumer Price Index. The practical implication of this law is that it will be nearly 
impossible for faculty members to engage in meaningful dialogue with universities about their 
conditions of employment during the coming years. 
The provisions limiting bargaining rights incensed unions and their supporters, sparking 
protests and court cases. In Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, a lower court judge initially blocked 
implementation of the legislation, but she was later overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
Once the state, county, and municipal governments were free to implement the provisions of SB 
11, tens of thousands of public employees lost access to effective representation; by late 
September 2011, almost all of Wisconsin’s public employee unions had been decertified.  In 
response, Wisconsin voters have collected and submitted petitions containing 1.9 million 
signatures to the state’s Government Accountability Board, triggering recall elections for the 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Senate majority leader, and three state senators who 
supported the legislation.  A date for the recall election has not yet been confirmed, although 
legally it could take place as early as May 29, 2012.   
2. Ohio Senate Bill 5 
Similarly, Ohio Senate Bill 5 sought to restrict the manner in which public employees can 
engage in collective bargaining.  The law, which was signed by the Ohio governor on March 31, 
2011, and impacted all of the state's 400,000 public workers, restricted public employees’ rights 
to strike and limited collective bargaining about financial issues to only wages and not for other 
issues such as for health insurance and pensions.  The law would have significantly increased the 
cost of employee contributions for pensions and healthcare over time.   
  Opponents of the law vowed to put the issue on the November 2011 ballot to give Ohio 
voters a chance to strike down the law.   Ohio activists gathered more than 1.3 million signatures 
(almost six times the amount needed) to place Senate Bill 5 on the ballot for repeal. SB5 was 
repealed by Ohio voters in a decisive and historic vote; this marked the first time voters upheld 
public employee collective bargaining rights on a statewide ballot.  
 
3. Michigan Senate Bill 971 
 
On March 13, 2012, Governor Rick Snyder signed into law Michigan Senate Bill 971 
which bars the unionization of graduate assistants at Michigan’s public universities.  The law 
amends the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act to specifically exclude graduate student 
research assistants (GSRA) from the definition of “public employees” for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.  SB 971 was introduced as a direct reaction to the efforts of the University 
of Michigan GSRA’s to unionize. 
 
4. Arizona  
Four anti-union bills are being considered by the current legislative session in Arizona.  
All four bills target the collective bargaining rights of public workers and are modeled in the 
spirit of Wisconsin’s attack on public workers last March.  The Arizona senate passed the first of 
the four measures in mid-February.  That bill would make it impossible for unions to deduct dues 
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automatically from members’ paychecks.  The second bill recently approved by the senate would 
prohibit government employees from performing union work while they’re on the clock.  Both of 
these bills target core functions of labor unions – dues collection and member communication. 
Arizona has long been a “right to work” state and the current push for additional 
legislation, funded in large part by the Koch brothers, is intended to reinforce that existence. 
VIII. Miscellaneous 
 
The United State Tax Court issued a ruling about the employment status of online faculty 
as it concerns the filing of personal income tax forms.  Although factually specific to one faculty 
member, the court laid out an analysis that is likely to be used in similar situations. 
 
A. Tax  
 
1. Schramm v. Com’r, 102 T.C.M (CCH) 223, (2011) 
 
Professor William Edward Schramm sued the IRS Commissioner, alleging that the IRS 
had improperly ruled that Schramm was a common law employee of Nova Southeastern 
University (NSU), thereby preventing him from claiming certain business expenses as an 
independent contractor or “statutory employee” on his taxes.  Such a ruling resulted in an 
approximate $700 difference in what the IRS deemed Schramm to owe the IRS for his 2006 tax 
filing. 
 
Professor Schramm began teaching online courses for NSU as an adjunct professor in 
1999.  Between 1999 and 2006 Schramm taught between 4 and 12 online courses per year for the 
university.  Each course was covered by a separate contract between Schramm and the 
university, and each contract indicated that he was required to abide by certain university 
policies as a condition of his employment.  In addition, the university withheld federal and state 
tax obligations on his behalf.   
 
When filing taxes for the 2006 tax year, Schramm reported certain business expenses on 
a “Schedule C” form indicating that he believed his employment relationship with NSU was that 
of an independent contractor or “statutory employee” and not that of a “common law” employee.  
The practical result of this filing is that Schramm avoided applying a 2 percent limitation rule on 
his expenses.  “Common law” employees are allowed to list unreimbursed business expenses as 
itemized deductions on “Schedule A” of their 1040, but only to the “extent that [those expenses] 
exceed 2 percent of the [employees’] gross income.”  “Schedule C,” which is available to 
independent contractors and “statutory employees,” does not have the same 2 percent limitation 
and, therefore, allows business expenses to be deducted in full. 
 
In reviewing the Commissioners decision, the United States Tax Court ruled that it must 
apply common law rules for determining whether or not Schramm was an employee because the 
Internal Revenue Code does not define “employee” in the section discussing the tax treatment of 
business expense deductions.  Specifically, the court ruled that the relevant factors in 
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determining employment status includes: 1) degree of control by employer; 2) the parties’ 
investment in the work facilities used; 3) the opportunity for individual profit or loss; 4) whether 
the employer can discharge the individual; 5) whether the work involved is part of the 
employer’s regular business; 6) the permanency of the relationship; 7) the relationship the parties 
believed they were creating; and 8) the provision of employee benefits. 
 
Using this analysis, the court found, in pertinent part, that Schramm was a “common law” 
employee of NSU because, despite the fact that the inherent nature of his position as an adjunct 
called for him to follow an independent approach to teaching, the university exercised sufficient 
control over his work as it dictated the textbook he used in his classes, the subjects he was to 
cover in each, and managed the students enrollment and technical interface for each class.  In 
addition, the court found that NSU had invested a greater amount in the facilities needed for the 
classes; that Schramm and NSU had maintained “a consistent employment relationship” for 
many years; and, that NSU has withheld income and employment taxes from Schramm’s wages 
throughout the relationship.  All of these factors were judged to be consistent with a finding that 
Schramm was a “common law” employee of NSU.  Therefore, the court upheld the 
Commissioner’s ruling that Schramm must use Schedule A, not Schedule C, to itemize his 
business expenses as deductions that are subject to the 2 percent limitation (business expenses 
may only be deductible as itemized deductions “only to the extent that they exceed 2 percent of 
the taxpayers adjusted gross income). 
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